Troy & Schwartz Attorneys-At-Law

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in the case this blog summarizes is encouraging for any tech company that licenses access to its proprietary information or makes some part of it publicly available.  The decision holds that under Florida’s Uniform Trade Secret Law, these partial exposures of trade secrets to the public may not be fatal to a claim for trade secret misappropriation. 

There is no question that the law continues to evolve in response to new technological developments.   For example, corporate espionage has become easier in these days of computer hacking, thereby increasing the possibility of the theft of valuable proprietary information such as trade secrets.  Does Florida’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (FUTSA) adequately protect the trade secret owner from “high tech” misappropriation of trade secrets?  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals said yes in its 2020 decision in Compulife Software, Inc. v. Newman, et al., 959 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2020).   The court held that the statute’s verbiage was indeed applicable to this “industrial espionage” case.  The court also solidified the FUTSA by clarifying the definition of misappropriation.

Plaintiff Compulife Software, Inc. sells access to its online databased of insurance premium information, which synthesizes publicly available insurers’ rate tables using its proprietary method and formula.  It also provides life insurance quotes sourced from its online database.  The data base is not static but consistently updates with current information about life insurer’s rate tables and allows for direct comparison across dozens of providers.  Compulife licenses access to the data to its customers who are primarily life insurance agents who in turn seek to provide reliable insurance rate estimate to policyholders.

Interestingly, the lawsuit originating in the Southern District of Florida, did not include alleged violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), the most commonly applied federal law to web scraping. Indeed, plaintiff refrained from pursuing many of the common claims that often appear in web scraping litigation, such as trespass to chattels, conversion, tortious interference with a contract, and unjust enrichment.

The defendants and Compulife are in direct competition.  The lawsuit resulted from Compulife’s allegations that the defendants gained access to its database by falsely purporting to work for Compulife’s licensed customers, hiring a hacker to scrape data from Compulife’s database, and then using the scraped data to generate life insurance quotes on their own websites.  Not surprisingly, the court described the case as one involving high-tech corporate espionage.

Website scraping using software programs known has “bots” has been quite common and is often considered legitimate.  “Bad bots,” however, fetch content from a website with the intent of using it for purposes outside the site owner’s control.  “Bad bots make up 20 percent of all web traffic and are used to conduct a variety of harmful activities, such as denial of service attacks, competitive data mining, online fraud, account hijacking, data theft, stealing of intellectual property, unauthorized vulnerability scans, spam and digital ad fraud.”  See https://www.imperva.com/blog/is-web-scraping-illegal/.

The FUTSA requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that it: 1) possessed a trade secret; and 2) the secret was misappropriated.  The magistrate in the district court did find that Compulife’s database contributed a trade secret but that the trade secret had not been misappropriated. The magistrate’s reasoning?  Compulife had not identified what legal duty the defendants had violated.

The Eleventh Circuit found the magistrate’s reasoning erroneous.  Under the FUTSA, a trade secret can be misappropriated by either acquisition, disclosure, or use.  Compulife had alleged misappropriation by acquisition and use.   Relying on the FUTSA’s own wording, the court noted that there are several varieties of misappropriation by use that do not depend on the existence of any external legal duty.  Citing Fla. Stat. § 688.002(2)(b)1, 2a, and 3, the court explained that “[w]hen for instance, a defendant knows that his knowledge of a trade secret was acquired using ‘improper means,’ or that he has acquired knowledge of a trade secret ‘by accident or mistake’ and still uses it, such use is actionable misappropriation.”  “Improper” is defined by the statute as means including theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.  The court concluded that there was enough evidence that the database had been used by either improper means or accident or mistake and that these misappropriation theories must be determined before the court can dismiss a trade secret misappropriation claim.

The district court’s magistrate had also erred by finding that because the individual insurance quotes on Compulife’s website that the hacker scraped were publicly available, the database from which those quotes were sourced could not have been misappropriate by acquisition.  The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and reasoned that even if the publicly available individual quotes did not merit trade secret protection, “taking enough of them must amount to misappropriation of the underlying secret at some point.  Otherwise, there would be no substance to trade-secret protection for ‘compilations’ [of data] which the statute clearly provides.  See Fla. Stat. § 688.002(4).

The court also concluded that the method of acquisition could determine whether the taking of the publicly available quotes constituted misappropriation.  Here, the defendants did not merely manually access quotes from Compulife’s database wherein such manual copying would likely never constitute improper means.  Instead, the defendant’s usage of a bot to collect an otherwise infeasible amount of data may well constitute misappropriation – in the same way that using aerial photography may be improper when a secret is exposed to view from above.  Citing E.I. Dupont de Neumours & Co. v. Christopher, 431, F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1970), a case that had nothing to do with the difficult technical issues courts are asked to address today.  The court vacated the magistrate’s dismissal of the misappropriation by acquisition claim and remanded the case.

CONCLUSION

The case is expected to have ramifications in the area of trade secret law by allowing plaintiffs to claim that usage of their “website” publicly presented trade secret information comprises trade secret misappropriation.  Generally, publicly available information has not been deemed a trade secret.  This commentator opines that the decision will not defeat the need for a case-by-case factual analysis.  Relying on a 50-year-old non-tech case in support of their decision, the Compulife court clearly felt that that the defendants had “done the plaintiff wrong” and should be held accountable.  The reach of the decision remains to be seen.    It is therefore strongly recommended that any lawsuit involving trade secret misappropriation also includes counts such as those listed above in the event the claim for trade secret misappropriation fails.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST IN THIS BLOG.  AS USUAL THE CONTENT IS FOR   INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY AND IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. 

Intellectual property law is a complex area of the law.  Contact us for a complimentary consultation on patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and copyrights.  Our mission is to serve innovators and creators in protecting the fruits of their hard work and ingenuity through our Client Creed:  Conscientious, Rigorous, Energic, Empathetic, and Diligent legal services which cover both transactional and litigation services.

Have a question specific to trade secrets?  Contact us for a complimentary trade secret checklist.

© 2021 by Troy & Schwartz, LLC

In Dec. 2020 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the publication of a trade secret in a patent application extinguishes trade secret status.  Attia Architect PC, et al.  v. Google LLC, et al.   Architect Attia developed a system and method for automated design, fabrication, and construction called Engineered Architecture (EA).    In 2010 Attia entered into a partnership with Google wherein he disclosed his trade secrets related to the technology to Google.  A year later, Google filed patent applications related to the technology’s trade secrets.  Attia executed patent assignment agreements effectively transferring any rights in the patents to Google.  The patent applications were published 18 months from the filing date pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) making the alleged trade secrets publicly available.  Google then allegedly excluded Attia from the project and used EA to create a platform for use by building professionals to streamline the design process by relying on artificial intelligence.

Attia sued Google for trade secret misappropriation under California’s trade secrets statute and the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). The district court dismissed his federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.  Under both California state trade secrets law and the DTSA, the disclosure of the alleged trade secrets in the published patent application publication extinguished their status as protectable trade secrets.  (Click here for a previous blog concerning the same decision which  addressed another issue involving the DTSA). Nor was this a situation where Google had filed the patent applications without Attia’s permission.

Is it possible for trade secrets and inventions to co-exist?  Maybe.  Inventors may try to maintain what they as deem as trade secrets by failing to disclose key elements of the invention in the patent application and specification.  This approach can be difficult to navigate because inventors may risk invalidating a patent by withholding critical information from the patent examiner during prosecution of the patent.   But see Pike v. Texas EMC Management, LLC (Texas state appellate court finding that EMC had “purposely excluded certain information” from its patent application in order to maintain it as a trade secret and was thus entitled to maintain its claim against Pike for trade secret misappropriation.

Any information disclosed in a patent application publication or issued patent, is by definition, published and not subject to trade secret protection.   If the invention disclosed in a patent application is or will not be the subject of a foreign application, the patent applicant can file a non-publication request under 37 CFR 1.213(a) to prevent its publication 18 months later after the filing date.  For utility applications relying on the filing date of a provisional patent application (PPA), the clock starts ticking from the PPA’s filing date.  The non-publication request will allow the application to be maintained as a trade secret over the invention during the patent application prosecution process which can take many years.

If a patent does not issue, trade secret protection will continue until when and if the trade secret(s) become publicly available, through e.g., the inventor’s failure to maintain the trade secret in confidence.  If, on the other hand, the examining attorney concludes that claims are patentable, the inventor can make the determination as to whether issuance is “worth” giving up trade secret rights in the published patent document by deciding to withdraw the patent from issuance under 37 C.F.R. § 1.313.

Take Aways

• Dlsclose any trade secrets related to your invention to your patent attorney.  Ask the attorney whether inclusion of the trade secrets in the patent application is essential to meet the USPTO’s invention disclosure requirements.
• Consider filing a non-publication request providing you have no intention of filing a foreign application. If you do end up filing a foreign patent application, remember that that your U.S. patent application may also become subject to publication.
• Be sure to continue safely guarding your trade secrets quite apart from any confidential patent application.  Trade secret protection is an on-going endeavor
• Contact us for a complimentary trade secret checklist to get you started in understanding trade secret protection.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST IN THIS BLOG.  AS USUAL THE CONTENT IS FOR   INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY AND IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE.

Intellectual property law is a complex area of the law.  Contact us for a complimentary consultation on patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and copyrights.  Our mission is to serve innovators and creators in protecting the fruits of their hard work and ingenuity through our Client Creed:  Conscientious, Rigorous, Energic, Empathetic, and Diligent representation.

May you and your loved ones stay safe & be well during these challenging times.

© 2021 by Troy & Schwartz, LLC

Where Legal Meets Entrepreneurship™

On Dec. 16, 2020 in Attia, et al.  v. Google, LLC, et al.,  the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a misappropriation claim under the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, §18 U.S.C. 1836, et seq. (“DTSA”) may be brought for misappropriation that started prior to the DTSA’s enactment as long as the claim also arises from post-enactment misappropriation or from the continued use of the same trade secret.

The DTSA mirrors the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) and also expands the Economic Espionage Act, which criminalizes misappropriation of certain trade secrets. Many states, including Florida, have based their trade secrets laws on the UTSA.  Until the enactment of the DTSA in 2016, trade secret misappropriation claims were generally brought under state statutes, e.g., Florida’s Uniform Trade Secret Act (“FUTSA”).

The DTSA allows plaintiffs to bring a federal claim for any trade secret misappropriation that occurred on or after May 11, 2016.   In Attiva v. Google, LLC, the Ninth Circuit decided that a claim under the DTSA can still be brought, even if the misappropriation actually started before the enactment of the DTSA, as long as the misappropriation continued through the DTSA’s enactment date (May 11, 2016) and involved the same trade secret.  In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), includes an anti-continued use provision while the DTSA lacks a similar provision.  Noting that Congress was aware of the UTSA at the time the DTSA was enacted, the court concluded that the apparently deliberate omission of an anti-continued use provision indicated that the DTSA was not intended to be limited in this way.  In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the DTSA language discussing “a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim of misappropriation” relates only to a statute of limitations argument and does not intrinsically prohibit DTSA misappropriations claim from being brought on the basis of continued use.

Although the DTSA is a relatively new statute and has not “seen” much litigation, the Attiva decision clearly expands the DTSA’s reach and is expected to be relied on by other federal courts asked to rule along the same lines.   Additionally, the decision represents a significant shift in trade secrets law which may cause more plaintiffs to commence trade secrets misappropriation actions in federal court because:

• it allows for claims of trade secrets misappropriation to be brought under the DTSA at least in district courts “under” the Ninth Circuit even if the misappropriation began before the 2016 enactment of the DTSA;
• it expands potential liability for defendants of trade secret claims under the DTSA;
• it provides plaintiffs with protection where state statutes following the UTSA may not.

WE THANK YOU FOR READING THIS BLOG AND HOPE YOU FOUND IT INFORMATIVE.  HOWEVER, THE CONTENT IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL ADVICE.  If you have any questions about trade secret misappropriation as either a potential plaintiff or defendant, contact us for a consultation.  Also contact us for a complimentary trade secret checklist to ensure you or your company are taking the appropriate steps to protect your trade secrets.

©2021

Troy & Schwartz, LLC

Where Legal Meets Entrepreneurship™

(305) 279-4740

Background

This blog discusses the September 14, 2017 Florida Supreme Court’s holding in the consolidated cases of White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services of SE Florida, LLC, et al. and Americare Home Therapy, Inc. v. Hiles.

A previous blog discussed Florida’s restrictive covenant statute which, when compared to similar statutes in other states, is generally quite favorable to businesses when it comes to the enforcement of non-compete agreements.  Many lawsuits involving Fla. Stat. 542.335 involve a former employee who has left the employment of the business and either started a competing business or has gone to work for a competitor.  Generally, the employee has signed a non-compete agreement as a condition for employment with his former employer.  The former employer may commence a lawsuit to prevent the former employee and his new employer from using information associated with the former employer’s  legitimate business interests.  Where the former employee goes to work for a competitor of the former employer, both the former employee and new employer are often named as co-defendants.

Under the Florida statute, a contract providing restrictions on competition must involve a legitimate business interest as defined by statute to be enforceable.  Fla. Stat. 542.335(1)(b).  Both of the above referenced cases involved employees who had worked for businesses that relied on home health referral sources cultivated through extensive personal marketing and relationship building with potential referral sources, primarily physician’s offices.  Section 542.335 does not specify home health referral sources as a legitimate business interest but does provide a non-exhaustive list preceded by the words “legitimate business interest includes but is not limited to:

1. Trade secretes as defined in s. 688.002(4);
2. Valuable, confidential business or professional information that does not otherwise qualify as trade secrets;
3. Substantial relationships with specific, prospective, or existing customers, patients, or clients;
4. Customer, patient, or client goodwill associated with:  a) An on-going business or professional practice, by way of trade name, trademark, service mark, or trade dress; b) A specific geographic location; or c) Specific marketing or trade area;
5. Extraordinary or specialized training.”

The Florida Supreme Court’s Analysis

In White/Americare the Florida Supreme Court engaged in statutory interpretation to conclude home health referral sources were indeed legitimate business interests for several reasons.  First, the legislature’s stated examples were meant to be just that – examples.  The list was never intended to be exhaustive as clearly indicated by the words “includes but is not limited too.”

Second, the Court refused to interpret the statute in such a way so as to exclude a claimed legitimate business interest in non-identifiable prospective patients.  The Court tellingly stated “[g]enerally, it is improper to apply espressio unius to a statute in which the Legislature used the word include.  This follows the conventional rule in Florida that the Legislature uses the word “including” in a statute as a word of expansion, not one of limitation.” Slip opinion at 13.

Third, the Court noted that for home health care companies (HHCs), there is an “indispensable relationship between referral sources and their undisputed legitimate business interests in relationships with patients protected by the statute”  Furthermore, the Court noted that referral sources are somewhat analogous to customer goodwill which is expressly protected by the statute.  Slip opinion at 20.  It is important to understand the home health referral sources generally do not involve identifiable patients although the home health referral sources will hopefully result in referred patients who then of course become identifiable.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court was careful to point out that the statute does not protect covenants whose “sole purpose is to prevent competition per se because such contracts are void against public policy.  Even under Florida law with its pro-business stance, the courts have held that “[f]or an employer to be entitled to protection,   ‘there must be special facts present over and above ordinary competition such that, absent a non-competition agreement, the employee would gain an unfair advantage in future competition with the employer.’ ”  White/Americare citing Passal v. Naviant, Inc., 844 So. 2d 792, 795 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2003).   Slip opinion at 21.

The statute also allows the courts to ameliorate any concern regarding overly restrictive covenants by commanding the courts to modify any non-competition agreement that is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interest and to grant only the relief necessary to protect such interests.  Fla. Stat. s. 542.115.  Here both non-competition agreements were limited to certain geographical areas – to the counties where the HHCs actually operated for a period of one year.

Conclusively, by finding for the HHCs, the Court was not expanding the reach of restrictive covenants to limit competition.  It was merely finding that the nature of an HHC-based business necessitates the classification of its referral sources as legitimate business interests.

Take-Home Points

After White/Americare, businesses may be able to more easily establish legitimate business interests to protect their interests in non-compete agreements where the alleged business interest is not specifically articulated by the statute.   The decision shows, however, that the analysis will be fact-specific, and that the agreement must still be reasonably tailored to cover a reasonable geographic area and time-frame.  The plaintiff will also need to be able to adequately explain why the subject matter is a legitimate business interest based on the nature of the business.

This commentator notes that the conduct of the employee in Hiles was particularly egregious with respect to her transferring of Americare’s confidential information, including patient information, to her personal e-mail account both before she even gave notice of her resignation and after she was let go a few days after giving notice to Americare prior to her notice’s specified “last day.”

Clearly the technology age has made the wrongful usage/theft of a business’s intellectual property and/or confidential information (intangible assets) easy.  It is up to businesses, no matter how small, to be proactive in protecting their intellectual property and confidential information from this wrongful usage.  As the White/Americare holding demonstrates for cases involving employees, a non-compete agreement does not always prevent problems after an employee resigns or is terminated.   Contact us to obtain a complimentary checklist of suggested steps to take to help protect your business’s intangible assets and thereby try to eliminate the need of future costly litigation to protect your business’s interests.

© 2017 by Troy & Schwartz, LLC

WE THANK YOU FOR READING THIS BLOG.  HOWEVER, THE FOREGOING IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND IS PRESENTED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.  IF YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING ANY ACTION THAT MAY HAVE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER CONSULTING WITH AN ATTORNEY.

Background

Trade secrets can be extremely valuable business assets and all states have statutes governing the protection of trade secrets.  Even the federal government recognizes the importance of trade secrets to U.S. companies by enacting the Defend Trade Secrets Act in 2016 which allows a federal civil cause of action against a party accused of trade secret theft.

Lawsuits involving allegations of trade secret theft can arise in the context of employment law.  The typical situation is where an employee has left the employ of a company and the former employer commences a lawsuit for trade secret misappropriation against the employee and possibly the employee’s new employer.   The former employer will generally seek a temporary injunction to prevent the employee and new employer from using the trade secrets and associated confidential information.

What if the employee/new employer has not actually used the confidential information?  In the case of Hughes v. AGE Industries, LTD (No. 04-16-00693-CV) decided March 8, 2017, the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals held that a temporary injunction does not require a party alleging trade secret misappropriation to show actual usage by the defendant(s).   Mere possession of the trade secrets/confidential information may well be sufficient for obtaining a temporary injunction.  Even though the case discussed in this blog is a Texas case, the commentator believes that a Florida state court would have come to the same conclusion based on the facts of the case and the Florida statute governing trade secrets.

Court’s Opinion

The case is an interesting one because of Hughes’ arguments presented in his appeal, all of which the Court found to be specious.   Hughes had been a twenty-year employee of Age Industries, LTD (“AI”) prior to resigning from the board of directors as AI’s general partner in May, 2016 and then from his employment by AI in June, 2016.  He went to work for Diamondback Industries, a newly formed company set up to compete with AI in June, 2016, as its operations manager.

AI sought a temporary restraining order from the trial court which was granted and sometime later the temporary injunction hearing was held.  At the hearing, AI presented a third-party contractor’s report which showed that Hughes had downloaded a large quantity of data from his AI computer to a USB drive.  On granting the temporary injunction, the trial court required Hughes to deliver a list describing all documents belonging to AI or containing proprietary information belonging to AI in Hughes’ possession “including but not limited to [AI’s] customer and prospective customer’s lists and contact information, pricing lists, sales journals, financial reports, vendor lists, engineering diagrams, customer presentation materials, specialized pricing programs, business strategies, and specially developed programs for specific customers.”  The order further enjoined Hughes from directly or indirectly disclosing AI’s proprietary or trade secret information.

Hughes attempted to reverse the temporary injunction order on procedural grounds by first arguing that AI’s petition had not been properly verified with an affidavit from AI’s president.  The appellate court disagreed and stated that “[a] verified petition for injunctive relief is not required to grant a temporary injunction, however, when a full evidentiary hearing on evidence independent of the petition has been held.”

Second, Hughes, argued that the trial court erred in granting the temporary injunction because it did not maintain the status quo as per his relationship with AI as a limited partner. He claimed that as a limited partner, he was entitled to receive information about AI under the terms of the partnership agreement.  Yet, at the temporary injunction hearing, Hughes stated that the only information he received as a limited partner was audited financial reports.

Hughes was also an employee of AI and because of AI’s Employee Handbook, his status quo argument failed. The handbook was very clear that all information regarding AI was confidential and should be treated as such and carefully defined what AI considered as confidential information. The appellate court opined that, because of the limited information Hughes received as a limited partner and the extensive information he received as an employee, the trial court had not erred in granting the temporary injunction. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited several Texas cases including two that stated that a fiduciary relationship arises from an employment relationship forbidding an employee from taking trade secrets and confidential or proprietary information in a manner adverse to the employer.  See, e.g., Mabrey v. Sandstream, Inc., 124 S.W. 3d 302, 316 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2003).

Hughes made several more arguments to no avail including one that AI did not produce any evidence of a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury.  Here Hughes’ own conduct thwarted his argument.  The court noted that evidence was admitted at the trial court hearing showing that Hughs had downloaded a large amount of data from his computer the month before he resigned.  This was proven by AI’s third-party contractor who had apparently been hired to “scour” Hughes’ company computer.

Further evidence showed that the financial information he maintained for 2015 and 2016 on behalf of AI could not be located after he left AI.  Hughes even admitted to having confidential information belonging to AI on his home computer and may have also had e-mails that contained confidential information on his home computer.  He could not testify under oath that had had never sent e-mails containing this proprietary information to one of the principals at his new company.  Because the evidence showed that Hughes was in a position to use AI’s trade secrets to obtain a market advantage, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding AI established a probable, imminent, irreparable injury.  AI was not required to show actual use of trade secrets/confidential information.  Based on the evidence showing Hughes’ conduct and his possession of confidential information, he was properly enjoined from using or disclosing AI’s information.

The Hughes case is an example of what could become an employer’s worst nightmare.  The facts showed that the former employee had apparently planned out his resignation from AI including deleting all his e-mail in the deleted folder from his company computer and downloading valuable information onto a USB for ready portability.  Technology has certainly made trade secret theft much easier.  From the appellate court’s written opinion, one can conclude that the judges were not particularly enthralled with Hughes’ conduct.

Useful Take-Home Points for Employers

1. Even small companies should consider having employee handbooks. AI’s employee handbook helped save the day because AI was able to establish that it had taken precautions in protecting its confidential information and alerting employees as to their responsibilities in protecting that information.
2. Employees should also be required to sign appropriate agreements emphasizing their obligations as related to protecting confidential information. Exit interviews should be conducted in a cordial manner, non-hostile manner.  At that time, the employee can also be reminded of his on-going obligations under the terms of his previously signed employee confidentiality agreement.
3. When an employee leaves a job, it may be advisable to have the employee’s company computer(s) checked by a third-party expert to determine if the employee downloaded confidential information onto an external device such as a USB, flash drive, smartphone, or external hard drive especially if there are any red flags concerning this employee. During the temporary injunction hearing, AI presented a third-party contractor’s report which showed that Hughes downloaded a large quantity of data from his company computer onto a USB.
4. After an employee’s departure, an examination of the person’s e-mail account may be worth-while in particular to determine if the person has been forwarding anything of consequence to his own personal e-mail account. E-mail issues were raised in the Hughes case.
5. Finally, most employees who are departing on good terms will let their employer know about their new place of employment. If the employee is mum as to where he is going, the employer may want to take some proactive steps to ensure that its confidential information has not been compromised by a departing employee.

Contact Troy & Schwartz, LLC to receive a free checklist of steps to take to protect your valuable confidential information and trade secrets. 

© 2017 by Troy & Schwartz, LLC

WE THANK YOU FOR READING THIS BLOG.  HOWEVER, THE FOREGOING IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND IS PRESENTED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.  IF YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING ANY ACTION THAT MAY HAVE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER CONSULTING WITH AN ATTORNEY OF YOUR CHOOSING.